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ABSTRACT
Privacy is among the key challenges to data integration
in many sectors, including healthcare, e-government, etc.
The PAIRSE project aims at providing a flexible, loosely-
coupled and privacy-preserving data integration system
in P2P environments. The project exploits recent Web
standards and technologies such as Web services and on-
tologies to export data from autonomous data providers
as reusable services, and proposes the use of service
composition as a viable solution to answer data integra-
tion needs on the fly. The project proposed new com-
position algorithms and service/composition execution
models that preserve privacy of data manipulated by ser-
vices and compositions. The proposed integration sys-
tem was demonstrated at EDBT 2013 and VLDB 2011.
1. INTRODUCTION
Data integration has been a long-standing chal-
lenge for the database community. This is moti-
vated by the number of contexts in which the need
for a flexible data integration mechanism has be-
come critical, including Web and enterprise data in-
tegration, scientific data exploration, data exchange
in government agencies, etc.
Much of the literature on data integration across
autonomous data sources has tacitly assumed that
data on the side of each data source can be revealed
and shared with other sources. In practice, however,
data integration scenarios are often hampered by
legitimate and widespread data privacy concerns.
In the healthcare application domain for example,
medical data are subject to many legislations (e.g.,
[2, 1]) around the world that restrict collection, pro-
cessing, and disclosure of personal data, and hold
data holders accountable for any unintended data
disclosure or misuse.
The PAIRSE project addresses the challenge of
flexible and privacy-preserving data integration in
peer-to-peer environments. Driven by the recent
trends of using SOA-oriented architectures for data
integration in modern enterprises, PAIRSE assumes
that data sources are exposed to the data sharing
environment as Web services. This type of services
is commonly known as data services [11], where
data services provide a well documented, platform
(and source) independent, interoperable method of
interacting with data. PAIRSE proposes a service
composition-based approach for on-demand data in-
tegration; i.e., heterogeneous data services from au-
tonomous service providers are selected and com-
posed on the fly to answer users’ queries. Data
privacy preservation is a key objective of PAIRSE.
Users in PAIRSE are allowed only to access the in-
formation they are entitled to for a given purpose.
PAIRSE focuses on modeling, discovering, select-
ing and composing data services to efficiently an-
swer users’ queries. The contributions of PAIRSE,
which was demonstrated at EDBT 2013 [5] and
VLDB 2011 [9], are summarized as follows:
• Semantic description model for data services :
The semantics of data services should be ex-
plicitly represented to automate their discov-
ery, selection and composition. We modeled
data services as “RDF Views” over domain on-
tologies to formally define their semantics [7].
The service description files (e.g., WSDLs) are
annotated with these RDF views.
• Query resolution by automatic service compo-
sition: Queries in PAIRSE are resolved by au-
tomatically selecting and composing data ser-
vices. We exploited mature query rewriting
techniques to devise a novel service composi-
tion algorithm [7, 9]. The algorithm relieves
users from having to manually select and com-
pose services, tasks that would generally re-
quire important programming skills. We pro-
posed also an efficient algorithm to locate rel-
evant services in a P2P environment [14].
• Privacy preservation: We proposed a privacy
preserving composition model [5, 8, 16]. Our
model allows services providers to locally en-
force their privacy and security policies when
their services are invoked. In addition, it pre-
vents services in a composition from learning
any information about the data that each other
holds, beyond what is permitted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of our integration system.
Section 3 describes our semantic modeling of data
services. Section 4 presents our composition ap-
proach. Section 5 presents our techniques to pri-
vacy preservation. Section 6 applies our work in
two application domains, and summarizes obtained
results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. PAIRSE’S ARCHITECTURE
The PAIRSE data integration system has a hy-
brid peer-to-peer infrastructure [14], where peers
form communities of interest, called Virtual Orga-
nizations VOs. Each VO has a common domain
ontology modeling its expertise, and peer members
that may have relations with members from other
VOs. Relations between peers exist only if there is a
mapping between the ontologies of their respective
VOs. PAIRSE does not impose any constraint on
the topology graph formed by the ontologies and the
different mappings. Peers export their (sharable)
data sources as data services.
PAIRSE follows a declarative approach to com-
pose data services (Figure 1). Data services in each
peer are modeled as RDF Views over domain on-
tologies to explicitly define their semantics. Users
formulate their queries on domain ontologies using
SPARQL query language. Then, our system ex-
ploits the defined RDF views (added as annotations
to service description files) to select and compose
the relevant services using an RDF query rewrit-
ing algorithm that we have devised for that pur-
pose. Queries may necessitate the use of remote
data services, in which case an efficient P2P ser-
vice discovery algorithm [14] is used to locate and
retrieve the descriptions of relevant services from
remote peers. The system generates then an exe-
cution plan for the composition and executes it to
provide the user with the requested data. As data
services may manipulate privacy-sensitive informa-
tion, PAIRSE proposed new service and composi-
tion execution models to preserve privacy.
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Figure 1: Peer Structure
3. SEMANTIC MODELING AND SERVICE
QUERYING
In this section, we explain our service composi-
tion based approach to query resolution.
3.1 Semantic Modeling of Data Services
Modeling and explicitly specifying the semantics
of data services are the first step towards the au-
tomation of service selection and composition.
In PAIRSE, we proposed in [7] to model data
services as RDF Parameterized Views (RPVs) over
domain ontologies. A parameterized RDF view uses
concepts and relations whose meanings are formally
defined in domain ontologies to define the semantic
relationships between input and output parameters
sets of a data service. A parameterized view is a
technique that has been used to describe content
and access methods in Global-as-View (GaV) inte-
gration architectures [13]. Figure 2 shows an RPV
of a service returning the personal information (i.e.,
name and dates of birth) of patients admitted in a
given medical center. Note that input parameters
are prefixed with the symbol “$” and output pa-
rameters are prefixed with the symbol “?”.
RDF views may also specify constraints to char-
acterize the data manipulated by their correspond-
ing services. These constraints may have different
forms, including simple interval constraints (e.g.,
X ∈ [a, b], where X is a variable used in an RDF
view), and fuzzy constraints interpreted according
to a fuzzy membership function (e.g., the medica-
tions returned by a service have “High” concen-
tration of hydroxypropy1-β-cyclodextrin; i.e., X is
High, where the fuzzy term “High” is interpreted
by a membership function specifying for each value
of X the degree to which it is high).
We adopted an approach similar to SAWSDL1 to
1http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/sawsdl/
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Figure 2: (a) a parameterized RDF view; (b)
its graphical representation
associate data services with their RPVs. We ex-
ploited the extensibility feature of the WSDL stan-
dard to annotate the WSDL files with RPVs.
3.2 Service-based Query Resolution
In PAIRSE, users’ queries are resolved by com-
posing relevant data services on the fly. Each virtual
organization in PAIRSE’s hybrid P2P architecture
has a DHT (Distributed Hash Table) to index its
published services [14]. Services are indexed accord-
ing to the ontological concepts used in their RPVs.
When a query is issued at a given peer, relevant
services are first sought in the same V O where the
query is posed, then the service discovery request is
propagated to connected V Os. The descriptions of
discovered services are then sent back to the initial
peer, where the relevant services will be selected and
composed. Furthermore, for each discovered service
we return the mapping path between the ontologies
associated with the expertise domains (i.e., VOs)
of the discovered service and the initial peer. This
mapping path allows the translation of RPV views.
We proposed a query rewriting based service com-
position algorithm to select and compose data ser-
vices on the fly [7, 9]. The algorithm, given a SPARQL
query, and a set of data services represented by their
RPVs, rewrites the query in terms of calls to rele-
vant services. Our algorithm extends earlier works
on query rewriting and data integration [13] in the
following aspects:
Compliance with the RDF/S data models : while
most of previous work has focused on relational and
XML data integration [13, 17], we considered the
case of RDF/RDFS data integration. Specifically,
our query rewriting algorithm takes into account
RDF schema constraints such as rdfs:subClassOf,
rdfs:subPropertyOf, rdfs:domain, and rdfs:range when com-
paring RPVs to queries. The consideration of RDFS
constraints is important as allows our system to in-
fer more results than the previous rewriting tech-
niques. For example, suppose there is a statement
in an RDFS ontology specifying that :Medication
rdfs:subClassOf :Drug. Given a data service S re-
turning the medications administered to a given pa-
tient, and a query Q for the drugs administered to
a given patient, our algorithm automatically infers
that S can be used to generate rewritings for Q.
Answering parameterized queries : while pre-
vious data integration systems have focused on an-
swering specific queries, PAIRSE has focused on an-
swering parameterized queries. The key focus was
on constructing compositions of services (i.e., pa-
rameterized integration plans) that are independent
of a particular input value. For example, assume a
parameterized query Q($x, ?y) for the medications
y that may interact with a given medication x. As-
sume also two data services:
S1($x,?y), where x ∈ [1, 5] and y ∈ [100,150],
S2($x,?y), where x ∈ [6,10] and y ∈ [150,200]
If Q was a specific query (Qx=2), then S2 would not
be considered in the rewriting (i.e., composition)
as x=2 is not covered by S2. In contrast, both of
S1 and S2 are usable for Q, to cover as much as
possible of the potential values of x. Our composi-
tion algorithm extends the previous ones with: (i)
a probabilistic subsumption test to determine in a
polynomial time the minimum number of services
required to satisfy the value constraints that may
be specified on query’s parameters [6], and (ii) a
mechanism to optimize the generated composition
plans based on value constraints specified in service
descriptions [7].
Inclusion of user’s preferences : often the num-
ber of candidate compositions that may be used
to answer the same query is very large. We pro-
posed an approach [9] to compute the top-k com-
positions based on user preferences. In our ap-
proach, we modeled user’s preferences using fuzzy
sets. We match the (fuzzy) constraints of the rel-
evant services to those of the query and determine
their matching degrees using a set of matching meth-
ods from the fuzzy set theory. We then rank-order
candidate services based on a fuzzification of Pareto
dominance and compute the top-k compositions.
4. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN PAIRSE
In this section, we briefly present our models to
preserve the privacy of manipulated data at the ser-
vice and the composition levels.
4.1 Privacy-preserving Service Execution
Model
Data returned by a data service may be subject
to different security and privacy concerns. For ex-
ample, different people may have different access
rights over the same data item; data subjects2 may
2We use the term data subject to mean the individual
whose information is manipulated by data services.
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Figure 3: A Privacy-preserving Service Exe-
cution Process
have different preferences about the disclosure of
their data, etc. A common approach in the database
field to handle such concerns is to push them to the
underlying DBMS by rewriting the query to include
these constraints [15]. However, this may not be ap-
plicable to data services as the same service may ac-
cess a multitude of heterogeneous data sources that
may not be necessarily managed by a DBMS. An al-
ternative approach is to enforce privacy and security
policies at the application level [4], by modifying, in
our case, the source code of data services. However,
this may not always be applicable, as most of cur-
rent data service creation platforms (e.g., AquaLogic
[11]) provide data services as black boxes that can-
not be modified. Even if the code was modifiable,
this approach often leads to privacy leaks [15].
We proposed a secure, privacy-preserving execu-
tion model for data services allowing service providers
to enforce their privacy and security policies with-
out changing the implementation of their data ser-
vices (i.e., services are seen as black boxes). Our
model is inspired by the database approach to “declar-
atively” handle the security and privacy concerns.
It involves the following steps (refer to Figure 3):
Step 1: View rewriting to integrate security and
privacy constraints. When a data service is invoked,
our model rewrites its corresponding RDF view to
take into account applicable security and privacy
rules from the service’s associated policies, which
are expressed using the OrBAC and PrivOrBAC
models over domain ontologies and take into ac-
count the data recipient (i.e., service consumer), his
purpose for requesting the data, and the consents of
data subjects [16]. The soundness and correctness
of our algorithm are demonstrated in [16, 8].
Step 2: Rewriting the extended view in terms of
data services. The extended RDF view vextended
may include additional data items (denoted by ∆v =
vextended−voriginal) required to enforce security and
privacy constraints. In this step, we find the data
services covering ∆v, and rewrites vextended in terms
of these services along with the initial service.
Step 3: Enforcing security and privacy constraints.
Services selected in the previous step are composed
and executed using the conventional service execu-
tion process. The composition returns (i) the data
items returned by the invoked service along with
(ii) the data items necessary to evaluate the se-
curity and privacy constraints. We defined a pri-
vacy filter that evaluates the privacy constraints of
the different items that are subject to privacy con-
straints in the view. Null values will be returned for
items whose privacy constraints evaluate to False.
We demonstrated the validity of our model by ex-
tending the architecture of the famous service con-
tainer AXIS3 2.0 with a new module implementing
our privacy-preserving service execution model.
4.2 Privacy-preserving Composition Exe-
cution Model
Executing compositions may disclose confidential
information to component services. Assume, for ex-
ample, a composition of two services: S1 returns
HIV patients in a given city, and S2 checks whether
a given patient has been treated for psychiatric dis-
orders. Such composition could be needed (by a
pharmaceutical researcher) to investigate the con-
nection between a chemical component present in
HIV medicines and the development of severe psy-
chiatric disorders. Assume also Bob is a common
patient to S1 and S2. If S2 is invoked with Bob’s
identifier, and the provider of S2 has an access to the
composition plan (i.e., he knows that Bob was out-
putted by S1), then he will infer that Bob is an HIV
patient. On the other hand, if the data returned by
S1 were completely privacy-sanitized (e.g., by re-
moving identifiers and sensitive information), then
the composition could not be executed.
We proposed a privacy-preserving composition ex-
ecution model in [5] that limits the information dis-
closed to services in a composition about the data
that each other holds. Our model distinguishes be-
tween the following entities: (i) the services in the
composition, (ii) the execution engine, and (iii) the
recipient of final results. It relies on two key ideas:
First, data services use the same order-preserving
encryption scheme OPES [3] to encrypt the identi-
fier attributes that are needed to connect data sub-
jects across the different services. They are still free
to protect non-identifier attributes with their own
techniques (e.g., anonymization, etc.). This way the
execution engine has only access to protected data
and can still link data subjects across services using
the encrypted identifier attributes (note that OPES
allows for applying equality queries on encrypted
3http://axis.apache.org/axis2/java/core/
data). By the end of the composition execution, it
removes from the final results the encrypted identi-
fier attributes before returning them to the recipi-
ent, who will thus get only privacy-sanitized data.
Second, we proposed a algorithm to allow the execu-
tion engine to generalize the encrypted value ve re-
ceived from a service Si before proceeding with the
invocation of the subsequent service Sj in the com-
position, such that the generalized value Gen(ve)
corresponds to k input encrypted values for which
Sj has outputs; e.g., the identifier of Bob is gener-
alized to cover k -1 other patients for which S2 has
an output (i.e., S2 will not be able to distinguish
between Bob and k -1 other patients).
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We evaluated our different techniques and algo-
rithms in the healthcare and bioinformatics applica-
tion domains. These domains have widely embraced
Web standards, such as XML and Web services [12,
10], and are characterized by the need for a flexible
and privacy-preserving data integration approach.
The cardiology hospital of Lyon provided us with
access to two medical databases. The identities of
patients in these databases were changed. We also
generated synthetic medical data about the same
patients. We implemented about /400/ data Web
services on top of our real and synthetic data. Ser-
vices were all deployed on an extended version of
AXIS 2.0 implementing our service execution model.
We built a medical ontology based on the building
blocks and the data types defined in the HL7 stan-
dard, and used it for the annotation of service de-
scription files. To evaluate our techniques in the
bioinformatics domain, we used a set of /300/ ser-
vices from the BioCatalogue registry4.
Figure 4 (part a) shows the query interface to
PAIRSE. Users are assisted in formulating their SPARQL
queries over domain ontologies. The figure shows
(in part b) also the composition plan of a selected
composition, along with the privacy-sanitized re-
sults (part c).
We conducted exhaustive experiments to evalu-
ate the performance of our integration system. We
summarize below obtained results5:
Composition construction and execution : Our
experiments in [7] showed that our composition al-
gorithm can handle hundreds of data services in a
reasonable time. For example, for chain queries [13]
and RPVs with a length of 3 or 4 object properties
the algorithm was able to handle up to 400 services
4http://www.biocatalogue.org/
5For detailed information about the considered settings
in each cited experiment, please refer to the correspond-
ing paper.
in less than 4 seconds.In the context of parameter-
ized queries, our experiments in [6] showed that our
algorithm to find the minimum set of services in-
troduced only a small cost at the composition con-
struction time (i.e., in all experiments the algorithm
required less than 10% of the time needed to rewrite
the query), and improved substantially the compo-
sition execution time (i.e., in all experiments the
composition execution time was reduced to less than
0.75% of the time needed without optimization), as
it removes redundant services. In the context of
preferences queries, our experiments in [9] consid-
ered that services can be grouped in classes. The ex-
periments showed that the top-k compositions can
be computed efficiently. For instance, for classes
containing about 400 services, the top-k composi-
tions are computed in less than 4 seconds.
Security and privacy preservation : The con-
ducted experiments in [8] showed that our secure
and privacy preserving service execution model added
only a small increase to the service execution time.
In all experiments, the cost incurred in the enforce-
ment of security and privacy constraints did not ex-
ceed 10% of the time required to execute the ser-
vice with ignoring these security and privacy con-
straints altogether. The conducted experiments for
the evaluation of our composition execution model
[5] showed that the time required to execute the
composition with privacy preservation is at most
three orders of magnitude of the time required with-
out privacy preservation (Ki was set to 4 in all
tests). We were able to cut down that cost to two
orders of magnitude by reusing the values of the
protocol parameters that were computed in past in-
vocations of the same services (and during the same
composition execution).
6. CONCLUSION
The goal of the PAIRSE project was to develop
new methods and techniques for flexible and privacy-
preserving data integration. We have evaluated our
composition-based approach in the healthcare and
the bioinformatics domains. The obtained results
[5, 9, 7, 14, 8, 16, 6] are promising.
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